Whilst consent can be implied for direct care purposes, based on the action of the patient, it is not usually reasonable to imply consent for secondary uses of data such as for research purposes.
Second, the paper has oversimplified the task of anonymising data and does not meet its own definition of 'anonymised' data. As the authors have described it, it is still possible to re-identify the patient. Simply storing longitudinal data for a patient that includes their visit dates will enable the patient to be identified by anyone who already knows a few of those visit dates. This is true regardless of whether the 'strong identifiers' are present or not. This weakness also spills over into the 'coded data' classification guidance. The risk of identifying patients when highly specific contextual data are provided (e.g. date of an operation) have been well explored within the pages of this journal. 4, 5, 6 Unfortunately there is no technology available to anonymise data for all possible users. What will work, however, is addressing the patient's fear of identification through a holistic approach to using their data; using established methods of pseudonymisation. Vetting researchers definitely helps here. But limiting 'illicit re-identification' from researcher, data or organisational failures would be a bigger advance.
